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ABSTRACT
Traditional corporatist groups such as business groups and unions still play an
important role in many countries, and the rumors exaggerate the decline of
corporatist structures. Nevertheless citizen groups have grown in number and
political importance. The authors show that Danish and Swiss citizen groups
have gained better access to the administrative and parliamentary venues in
the period 1975–1985 through 2010, but with Swiss citizen groups more
successful than their Danish counterparts, particularly with regard to the
parliamentary venue. Danish and Swiss neo-corporatism has confronted
similar socio-economic and political challenges during this period, but the
political opportunity structure is more favorable towards citizen groups in
Switzerland than in Denmark. The Swiss referendum institution makes
parliamentarians more open to popular demands while in Denmark strong
unions, a strong parliament and frequent minority governments make it more
difficult for citizen groups to be heard.
KEYWORDS Citizen groups; corporatism; Denmark; political opportunity structure; Switzerland
Introduction
Despite profound socio-economic and political changes, neo-corporatist
systems in Europe have remained relatively resilient since the 1970s in
terms of interest group intermediation and policy-making (Armingeon 2011;
Binderkrantz and Christiansen 2015). Interest groups remain indispensable
for governments in the implementation of public policy even if many govern-
ments have attempted to grant greater autonomy to organized interests.
While much has been written on the fate of corporatist structures and
actors, less is known about the integration of citizen groups in political and
administrative decision-making processes.
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The traditional corporatist partners are unions and business associations but
also include professional groups and institutional groups. Through corporatist
intermediation, the most powerful organizations have traditionally enjoyed a
particularly privileged position. In the European context, Lowery et al. (2015:
1221–4) note that corporatist intermediation systems are, by definition, the ulti-
mate form of bias, as they clearly privilege venue access and policy influence to
a limited number of favored groups. In this light, one might speculate as to how
different corporatist heritages affect the advent and possible political positions
of citizen groups that enter the decision-making arena from somewhere other
than society’s economic sector. Berry (1999) claims that citizens are increasingly
engaged in non-economic groups, such as environmental groups, consumer
rights, elderly groups and the promotion of civil rights. This raises questions
as to whether their chances of being integrated into the political and adminis-
trative decision-making processes are affected by the prevailing national cor-
poratist traditions.
This cross-country study compares the presence of traditional insiders
(business associations, trade unions, professional groups and institutional
groups) and citizen groups (public interest, identity and religious groups) in
the administrative and parliamentary venues in the decade 1975–1985
versus 2010 in two different corporatist settings. It is based on comparative
data on access of interest groups to the two venues. Access focuses on pres-
ence or absence of groups in decision-making structures. It does not capture
the influence of groups in policy processes. Access to institutional venues is a
precondition for any policy influence and political power, however, for which
reason it deserves attention (Eising 2007).
The next section introduces the literatures on corporatism and political
opportunity structures as a theoretical point of departure and develops two
main expectations. First, citizen groups have strengthened their positions in
decision-making processes of both countries. Second, Swiss citizen groups
have been more successful than their Danish counterparts in gaining access
to administrative and parliamentary venues. We then present the empirical
set-up and the study’s data. Finally, we discuss the main findings and put
them into perspective.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses: common trends,
different political opportunity structures
Corporatism is defined as the ‘institutionalized and privileged integration of
organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies’
(Christiansen et al. 2010: 28). The logic of privileging some interest groups at
the cost of others is straightforward. In a corporatist system, policy-makers
need a selected group with whom they can deliberate, negotiate and
bargain. Over time, some groups succeed in becoming accepted partners
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that can be trusted to engage in ongoing relationships. Groups enjoying such
privileges will fight to maintain their monopoly representation by keeping com-
petitors and newcomers away from the decision-making arenas.
The stock of all mobilized groups is an imperfect mirror of the society from
which they emanate, as political access for these groups is biased (Lowery et al.
2015). The heavy weight carried by unions, business associations and insti-
tutional groups in the first three quarters of the twentieth century reflects
the enormous societal efforts invested in the development of modern agricul-
ture, industries and services in the private sector, as well as education, health
and social services in the public sector. The development of modern production
systems mobilized groups based on economic and reproductive issues.
While economic associations remain important, the mobilization of groups
has shifted over the past four decades. We have witnessed the advent of new
values (e.g., environmentalism), new cleavages (e.g., authoritarian–libertarian)
and new political issues (e.g., immigration, morality or cultural issues), all of
which are not or loosely related to neo-corporatist issues. Even if collective
action problems are more difficult to overcome for groups mobilized on
these bases, new groups are actually formed (see Jordan et al. 2012 for the
United Kingdom [UK] and United States of America [USA]; Fisker 2015 for
Denmark; Gava et al. 2016 for Switzerland). Citizen groups may not be as
strong as economic associations in terms of delivering expertise, but they
do possess some of the resources demanded by decision-makers (e.g., infor-
mation about public mood, legitimization of political decisions and electoral
support, cf. Binderkrantz et al. 2015), and they challenge traditional corporatist
structures.
In order to understand what can happen when a corporatist system con-
fronts new groups from outside the economic sector, we draw on literatures
on corporatism and political opportunity structures (POS). We compare two
corporatist countries with different POS at two different times. We argue
that their corporatist structures have been exposed to roughly the same
pressures, and we then ask whether their POS affect the opportunities avail-
able to citizen groups to gain access to decision-making arenas. We thus
exploit a co-variational approach (cf. Blatter and Haverland 2012: 33ff.): if
we observe co-variation between the access of citizen groups and the differ-
ences in POS and there is no plausible co-variation between citizen group
access and other control variables, we may conclude that the POS probably
have an impact on the rise of citizen groups.
Common trends: the rise of citizen groups and pressure on neo-
corporatist systems
Interest groups are important for decision-makers because they can deliver
valued goods in exchange for access to decision-making arenas. Defined
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simply, access goods may be either information or political support/resistance
(Binderkrantz et al. 2015). Economic groups obviously control both resources.
Citizen groups have unique knowledge about the segment of society they
represent, and they may support or oppose decision-makers’ agendas in
important issues, such as environmental policy, consumer matters or social
policies.
Between-group competition is supposedly less intense in corporatist
systems than in pluralist environments because some insider groups have
exploited their access goods to obtain privileged access to political actors
and tend to be more resourceful in terms of members, finance and expertise.
Citizen groups enjoy less favorable access to decision-making arenas in cor-
poratist countries than in pluralist countries. The propensity to form citizen
groups is lower and the costs of access to decision-making venues higher
in corporatist systems (see Fisker 2015). We cannot test this claim here
because we examine two corporatist systems. We can, however, investigate
what happens when corporatism comes under pressure. This happened in
Denmark and Switzerland during the last four decades. Besides the affirma-
tion of new citizen groups, four transformations at work represent more favor-
able opportunities for citizen groups to gain access to decision-makers.
First, retrenchment policies have come to take up much more space on the
government agenda. Evidence from Denmark (Blom-Hansen et al. 2012) and
Switzerland (Häusermann et al. 2004; Sciarini 2014) shows that retrenchment
decisions are difficult to carry out within corporatist structures, partly due to
the related logic of exchange between corporatist partners.1 On the other
hand, such decisions put corporatist actors, especially trade unions, under
pressure: retrenchment policies possibly give specific citizen groups (humani-
tarian groups, disability organizations or associations for the elderly) incen-
tives to mobilize against cuts and program curtailments.
Second, themediatization of politics implies that the media are increasingly
shaping political processes (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999). Clear traces of med-
iatization are found in Denmark (Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010) and
Switzerland (Landerer 2014). Mediatized processes contrast closed and
secret negotiations among neo-corporatist partners, which have a low news
value. Mediatization is therefore increasingly incompatible with corporatist
policy-making. Mediatized policy processes may enhance citizen groups
who have a comparative (but not absolute) advantage in gaining media
access (Binderkrantz et al. 2015: 105–6).
Third, a re-parliamentarization process with possible consequences for
group advocacy strategies has been at work. The famous Rokkan quote
‘votes count, resources decide’ (1966: 105–6) hinted that the administrative
venue was more important than the parliamentary venue for corporatist
groups. This may have been true, but we observe a relative shift in the
balance between the two venues (Rommetvedt et al. 2013). The Swiss and
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Danish parliaments have increased their power vis-à-vis the government. They
have introduced permanent committees, and MPs have specialized in
selected policy areas. Interest groups – including citizen groups – are thus
expected to invest more intensively in the parliamentary venue because of
MPs’ increased competencies (Eichenberger et al. 2016; Sciarini et al. 2015).
Like the media arena, the parliamentary arena grants citizen groups a com-
parative advantage in terms of access because they can offer parliamentarians
information and support (or resistance) (Binderkrantz et al. 2015: 105–6).
Fourth, the Europeanization of public policies has moved some decision-
making power from the national to the EU level, and groups have increasingly
been forced to orient themselves towards Brussels (Christensen 2010). Swit-
zerland has adopted parts of EU law in order to be part of the Single
Market (Gava and Varone 2014). Swiss decision-making processes are also
directly affected by Europeanization, as is obviously also the case for EU
member state Denmark. In Europeanized policies, pre-parliamentary nego-
tiations between national neo-corporatist actors are weakened (Mach et al.
2003; Sciarini 2014), parliamentary oversight of Europeanized processes is
increasing over time, and citizen groups aim at contributing to this scrutiny
exercise (Gava et al. 2016).
The increasing role of citizen groups since the 1970s and the structural
pressures on corporatist regimes have contributed to transforming the
policy-making process towards increased openness to citizen group partici-
pation. The joint effect leads to the first hypothesis, according to which
present-day citizen groups in Switzerland and Denmark have better access to pol-
itical arenas than in the 1970s and 1980s.
Differences in political opportunity structures
While our first hypothesis postulates that citizen groups challenge the cor-
poratist groups’ strong positions in both countries, the next question is how
this challenge is spelled out in two corporatist societies with different political
opportunity structures.
The POS literature analyses the variations with which social movements are
integrated into social and political structures. Kitschelt (1986: 63) points out a
number of factors that determine the openness of a political system towards
new demands from organized interests. To these factors belong the patterns
of intermediation between interest groups and decision-makers and the
extent to which they are ‘pluralist’ or not. Kriesi et al. (1992) distinguish
between three POS properties that determine how a political system includes
or excludes social movements: formal institutional structure, informal pro-
cedures and strategies with respect to how challengers are met and, finally,
the ‘configuration of power relevant for the confrontation with challengers’
(Kriesi et al. 1992: 220). By the latter, they refer to strategies pursued by
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existing insiders (i.e., corporatist groups) and their possible effect on the chal-
lengers’ prospects for success (i.e., citizen groups).
Despite similar corporatist characteristics, Denmark and Switzerland have
important differences in their POS that might affect the political integration
of citizen groups.
First, they differ in how they configure power. Whereas Denmark rep-
resents the social version of democratic corporatism (strong labor movement
and a strong social democratic party), Switzerland belongs to the liberal
version, with weak unions and politically strong business associations (Katzen-
stein 1985: 104–5, 129).
Danish corporatism dates back to the early 1900s, when labor unions had
grown strong enough to enter into agreements with the main employers’
organization on basic labor market rules (Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003).
Corporatist structures later developed to cover policy areas such as education,
judicial policy and environmental policy, and institutional groups such as
Local Government Denmark or the Association of Danish High School
Leaders grew strong. Danish corporatism is characterized by strong business
and labor organizations, strong institutional groups and close relations to the
state. In Switzerland, economic peak associations have traditionally been con-
sidered influential political actors. In a context of an underdeveloped central
state, weak national political parties, and a weakly professionalized parlia-
ment, major economic interest groups have played a key policy role due to
their resources (in terms of finances, membership, expertise and institutional
recognition). By contrast, trade unions remained fragmented along confes-
sional and professional cleavages and never reached Danish unionization
levels. Trade unions were not integrated in corporatist structures until the
1930s (Eichenberger and Mach 2011).
Danish social corporatism grants trade unions a much stronger position
than in Switzerland. Since strong unions already represent or incorporate
the demands of some citizen interests, it is probably more difficult for
Danish groups to win access than for Swiss citizen groups.
Second, some central formal institutions distinguish both countries, which
might affect citizen group access to the decision-making process. First,
Denmark is a unitary state with a strong central government, whereas Switzer-
land is a federal state with a comparatively weak central state, largely relying
on the collaboration of civil society groups. Second, direct democracy in
Denmark is in practice confined to EU-related issues, whereas Switzerland
has unique traditions for frequent popular referenda that makes the Swiss pol-
itical élite more permissive towards new demands from different groups.
Third, Switzerland has a (still) weakly professionalized parliament, with
many MPs linked to various groups, whereas the Danish parliament under-
went professionalization earlier. Such differences might affect the connec-
tions of MPs to interest groups and their access to the parliamentary venue.
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Finally, while Bloodgood et al. (2014: 724) underline that restrictive regulations
towards NGOs are much more developed in corporatist countries, Switzerland
appears to be the only corporatist country with permissive regulations
towards NGOs. The POS appear to be more open to citizen groups in Switzer-
land than in Denmark.
If we take into account the differences between both countries concerning
their formal institutions and informal practices towards citizen groups, as a
second hypothesis, we expect that Swiss citizen groups have been more suc-
cessful than Danish citizen groups in establishing access to decision-makers in
the period from the 1970s/1980s to 2010.
Data
To assess empirically if and to what extent citizen groups have succeeded in
gaining access to the administrative and parliamentary venues, we have gath-
ered comparative data documenting group presence for both countries in the
1970s–early 1980s, the height of corporatism in both countries, and in 2010,
30–40 years later, a period marked by the affirmation and consolidation of
new citizen groups and important pressures on corporatist regimes. Table 1
overviews data.
The administrative venue is often considered the most important, as this is
where groups may achieve the strongest positions via membership of public
committees, regular negotiations with civil servants and so forth. Expertise
concerning the government machinery and putting legislation together
rests with the administration, and groups may be involved in formulating pol-
itical advice, preparing legislative decisions or implementing policy programs.
Groups also supply politically relevant information and support that is valu-
able for administrators because of pending political processes in and
around the parliament.
Table 1. Overview of the data gathered.
Access to
institutional
venue
Administration Parliament
Pre-parliamentary committees and
public consultations Parliamentary committees and Plenum
Permanent access
Ad-hoc
mobilization Permanent access
Ad hoc
mobilization
Denmark Seats in extra-
parliamentary
committees (1975
and 2010)
Answers during
consultations
(2009/2010)
MPs employed by
interest groups and
MPs with leading IG
positions (1975 and
2010)
Letters to
legislative
committees
(1975 and 2010)
Switzerland Seats in extra-
parliamentary
committees (1980
and 2010)
Answers during
consultations
(2010)
MPs paid officials of
IGs or leading
positions (1985 and
2010)
Interest ties of MPs
in legislative
committees
(1985 and 2010)
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The parliamentary venue is also important, but far fewer MPs are policy
specialists, which renders it more difficult for groups to establish strong
relations with MPs and, thus, gain a hand in setting the agenda and formulat-
ing policy (Binderkrantz et al. 2015). Some groups may establish close
relations with MPs by having them on their board or payroll.
Data capture two main categories of groups. Corporatist groups include: (1)
unions; (2) business associations; (3) institutional groups (e.g., Local Govern-
ment Denmark); and (4) professional groups (e.g., Swiss Medical Association).
Citizen groups include: (1) public interest groups promoting common goods
(e.g., World Wildlife Fund); (2) identity groups representing a delimited consti-
tuency (e.g., women, tenants, minorities, patients); (3) religious groups (e.g.,
Swiss Evangelical Alliance); and (4) leisure groups (e.g., scout groups).
Empirical analysis
Administrative venue
In both countries, committees have been an important venue for corporatist
policy-making throughout the twentieth century, which has been viewed as
the strongest indicator of the strength of corporatism. To the extent that
numbers count, the 1970s are the strongest hour of both committee
systems (Christiansen et al. 2010; Germann 1985).
Two major changes have occurred in the committee system since the
1970s (cf. Table 2). The first is a substantive drop in committee numbers in
both countries: from 327 in 1975 to 251 in 2010 in Denmark, and from 298
in 1980 to 217 in 2010 in Switzerland.2
The second change concerns the function of the committee system. In
1975 in Denmark, 46 per cent of all committees were somehow involved in
policy preparation, either with the function to recommend or even draft pol-
icies to handle a politically defined problem. Today, only 10 per cent are occu-
pied with policy preparation (Christiansen et al. 2010). Today, policies are
prepared within the ministerial hierarchies under the full control of ministers
Table 2. Seats in permanent extra-parliamentary committees: distribution across group
types.
Committee seats (%)
Denmark Switzerland
1975 2010 Change 1980 2010 Change
Corporatist groups 87.5 83.8 −3.7 83.1 76.0 −7.1
Unions 28.7 25.4 −3.3 19.7 19.6 −0.1
Business 46.1 39.2 −6.9 43.6 36.3 −7.3
Institutional 10.4 14.2 +3.8 12.4 14.4 +2.0
Professional 2.3 5.0 +2.7 7.4 5.8 −1.6
Citizen groups 12.5 16.2 +3.7 16.9 24.0 +7.1
Total seats occupied by IG representatives 1,073 1,622 1009 480
Total Committees 327 251 298 217
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and civil servants. Groups are consulted and sometimes involved in nego-
tiations, but the close, institutionalized integration of groups in policy-
making through committees is an almost closed chapter.
Despite fewer policy-preparing committees, the Danish committee system
as a whole remains viable as 251 permanent committees remain in 2010, and
as Table 2 shows, groups have more seats in 2010 than in 1975 despite the
lesser number of committees. Even if citizen groups have more seats in
2010 than in 1975, corporatist groups are more overrepresented in the
present committee system if we take the entire population of interest
groups into account.3
In sum, the Danish committee system is still viable as a venue for the inte-
gration of groups into administrative and advisory tasks. Groups even have
more seats today than in 1975, and citizen groups have a larger share of
the groups today compared to 1975, even if they remain heavily
underrepresented.
Switzerland has also seen a dramatic drop in the number of extra-parlia-
mentary committees, and they play a less important role in the legislative
process because of the revalorization of the parliament and the increasing
difficulty of reaching compromises during the pre-parliamentary phase
(Häusermann et al. 2004; Sciarini 2014). Contrary to Denmark, however, the
number of group representatives has significantly declined in line with the
reduced number of committees. Furthermore, business associations have
clearly declined, whereas the position of trade unions remains stable and
the number of citizen group representatives has increased. Swiss citizen
groups have fared better than the Danish. For example, the traditionally
very corporatist Committee for Economic Affairs, which was only composed
of representatives of business associations and trade unions (with a few econ-
omics professors), has been enlarged since 2000 to also include representa-
tives of consumer associations and environmental and humanitarian groups.
A second indicator of the relation between groups and bureaucracy is how
interest groups react to administrative consultations. In both countries, the
government sends out draft bills for comments before they are presented
to parliament. Invitations are sent out broadly, mostly to public authorities
and groups, and it is also possible for non-invited groups to respond.
The consultation procedure is probably more important in Switzerland
than in Denmark because of the optional referendum: i.e., the opportunity
to contest the parliament’s decision in a popular vote. The aim of this external
consultation is, thus, to ‘test’ the political acceptability of a legislative proposal
by the main stakeholders. If key actors voice strong opposition to the propo-
sal, the bill will most likely be revised in order to avoid an ex post optional
referendum.
Unfortunately, we do not have data for the 1970s. Table 3 shows group par-
ticipation in the consultation procedure in 2009/10 in Denmark and 2010 in
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Switzerland. In Denmark, 416 unique groups submitted 1,692 substantial
responses. The distribution of answers is not very different from the distri-
bution of group seats in committees. Corporatist groups produced almost
80 per cent of the answers, slightly more than half of which are produced
by business associations (Binderkrantz et al. 2014). Swiss business associations
produced 43 per cent of 2,206 answers, whereas trade unions, which enjoy
privileged access to extra-parliamentary committees (20 per cent of seats),
are not very active in the consultation procedures (4 per cent). The reverse
is true for professional groups, with no privileged access to extra-parliamen-
tary committees (5 per cent of seats), but which are more present during
ad hoc consultations. Finally, Swiss citizen groups are much more active in
administrative consultations (32 per cent) than in extra-parliamentary com-
mittees (24 per cent) and much more active than the Danish citizen groups.
On the whole, Danish and Swiss administrative venues are still dominated
by corporatist groups, even if citizen groups have improved their foothold
slightly, particularly in Switzerland. Citizen groups are also more present
during consultation procedures than in the extra-parliamentary committees,
where corporatist insiders continue to dominate.
Parliamentary venue
The parliamentary venue is also important for groups, as it has the power to
amend proposals put forward by the government and ultimately passes legis-
lation. Groups that failed to affect administrative proposals and decisions may
compensate by trying to affect MPs’ legislative behavior. Some groups may
have privileged relations to parties because they share similar goals or to indi-
vidual MPs because they entertain direct relations, such as employment
relations or occupying leading positions.
As in other neo-corporatist countries, major Danish and Swiss parties have
historically had close relations to economic associations, such as business
associations, trade unions or farmers’ associations. This common legacy
should, however, be nuanced concerning the statute of the parliament and
howMPs are connected to groups. Whereas the Danish Parliament underwent
an early professionalization process, the Swiss Parliament remained an outlier
Table 3. Answers to administrative consultations: distribution across group types.
Answers to consultations (%) Denmark 2009/10 Switzerland 2010
Corporatist groups 78.8 68.2
Unions 20.0 4.4
Business 41.1 42.7
Institutional 14.9 5.0
Professional 2.8 16.1
Citizen groups 21.2 31.8
Total Answers 1692 2206
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in the European context due to its weak professionalization. Until the 1990s,
Swiss MPs were remunerated very modestly according to the ‘militia prin-
ciple’, meaning that they are not full-time politicians and still exercise a
main professional occupation alongside their parliamentary mandate. This
largely explains the economic interests of Swiss MPs, especially through
leading positions in business associations and trade unions, board member-
ships or as CEOs.
As regards the permanent access of groups to the parliament, MPs may
have previously been employed by or held leading positions in a group.
Such historic relations create unique opportunities for access by and recep-
tiveness towards groups. When such relations are still intact – via a leading
position or type of employment – the relevant groups are even more privi-
leged in terms of access and potential influence.
A comparison of the number of paid officials from groups and MPs in
leading group positions reveals pronounced differences between the two
countries. Whereas paid officials were completely absent in the Danish Parlia-
ment already in the 1970s, such associative officials remain present in the
Swiss Parliament in 2010. Around 12 per cent of Swiss national councilors
were salaried by an interest group in the 1970s, and 7.5 per cent (15 out of
200) were still paid officials of groups in 2010 (Table 4).
The two countries also differ considerably in terms of leading positions
held by MPs. In Denmark, party–interest group relations crumbled during
the late twentieth century. The Liberal Party looked for new voter groups to
replace the still fewer farmers, while the Social Democrats correspondingly
looked for replacements for the shrinking manual workers. At the same
time, formal organizational ties with the unions disappeared (Allern et al.
2007). In 1975, 47 per cent of Danish MPs had held a leading position at
some point (e.g., as board chair, member or elected shop steward), and 19
Table 4. Leading positions and paid officials in groups for MPs.
Denmark: MPs
occupying leading
positions (% of total
MPs)
Switzerland a: MPs as
paid officials (% of total
MPs)
Switzerlanda: Proportion
of leading positions held
by MPs (% of total leading
positions)
1975 2010 Diff. 1980 2010 Diff. 1985 2010 Diff.
Corporatist groups 8.4 2.2 −6.2 7.0 5.0 −2.0 72.2 40.2 −32.0
Unions 5.0 .6 −4.4 2.5 2.0 −0.5 9.8 4.0 −5.8
Business 2.2 .6 −1.6 4.5 3.0 −1.5 42.2 22.3 −19.9
Institutional .6 1.0 +.6 0 0 0 17.3 7.7 −9.6
Professional .6 0 −.6 0 0 0 2.9 6.2 +3.3
Citizen groups 10.6 13.4 +2.8 1.5 2.5 +1.0 27.8 59.8 +32.0
Total 19.0 15.6 −3.4 8.5 7.5 −1.0 100 100
Sources: Denmark: 1975: Folketingets Håndbog. 2010: Folketinget efter valget. Switzerland: Eichenberger
et al. 2016 (paid officials); Registre des liens d’intérêt 1985 and 2010 (leading positions).
aOnly National Council for Switzerland. Total leading positions in national interest groups (local and
regional interest groups excluded): 1985 = 182 (9 missing), 2010 = 323 (16 missing).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 11
per cent still held such a position while in Parliament (data not presented
here). In 2010, far fewer MPs had previous experience from corporatist
groups, while more had previous experience with leading citizen group pos-
itions. Looking at MPs’ positions while in parliament (Table 4), the picture also
changes. Leading positions have gone from few (8 per cent) to almost none (2
per cent) for corporatist groups, while the level has increased slightly for
citizen groups (from 11–13 per cent).
In the weakly professionalized Swiss parliament, MPs much more fre-
quently hold leading positions in various groups. The presidents of some
top economic associations have repeatedly been MPs during the twentieth
century. While the number of paid officials has declined, the number of
leading positions in groups occupied by MPs has clearly increased from
1985 to 2010. We also observe a profound development in the leading pos-
itions assumed by MPs. MPs are increasingly linked more closely to citizen
groups than to corporatist associations. In 2010, citizen groups represented
59.8 per cent of all leading positions in interest groups among MPs.
Regarding policy-related access, we look at contacts made in relation to
specific attempts to affect the policy agenda and decisions of MPs. For
Denmark, the empirical indicator refers to the number of letters written to par-
liamentary committees in 1975 and in 2010. Danish parliamentary committees
scrutinize bills and discuss general matters regarding relevant issues. The
committee or its individual members pose questions to the minister, many
of which appear to originate from letters from groups (Pedersen et al.
2014). We have identified all letters sent from nationwide groups in the two
parliamentary years (359 letters in 1974/75 and 1,071 in 2009/10).
Not surprisingly, Table 5 shows that the mobilization pattern in 1975 was
dominated by corporatist groups. However, unions and institutional groups
are heavily overrepresented compared to their population share, while
Table 5. Letters or representatives ‘sent’ by groups to parliamentary committees.
Denmark: Letters (%)
sent to committees
Switzerland: % of
leading positions in IGs
occupied by MPs in
CEATa
Switzerland: % of
leading positions in IGs
occupied by MPs in
CSSHa
1975 2010 Diff 1985 2010 Diff 1985 2010 Diff
Corporatist groups 73.8 50.4 −23.4 73.5 60.1 −13.4 84.6 47.2 −37.4
Unions 27.0 15.8 −11.2 0.0 7.3 +7.3 11.5 5.6 −5.9
Business 31.5 24.1 −7.4 26.5 36.4 +9.9 38.5 30.6 −7.9
Institutional 10.3 8.4 −1.9 41.2 7.3 −33.9 26.9 2.8 −24.1
Professional 5.0 2.1 −2.9 5.9 9.1 +3.2 7.7 8.3 +0.6
Citizen groups 26.2 49.6 +23.4 26.5 39.9 +13.4 15.4 52.8 +37.4
Total (DK: Letters sent;
CH: Leading IG
positions)
100%
359
100%
1,071
100%
35
100%
55
100%
26
100%
36
Sources: Registre des liens d’intérêt 1985 and 2010.
aCEAT: Economic affairs and taxation committee; CSSH: Social security and health affairs committee.
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professional associations are underrepresented. The picture has changed sig-
nificantly in 2010. Corporatist groups in both countries are now underrepre-
sented, whereas citizen groups are overrepresented.
Even though Swiss groups also send letters to parliamentary committees or
are heard by these committees, we do not have similar systematic Swiss data
concerning the mobilization of groups. As a functional equivalent, we have
measured the number of MPs with formal ties to national groups and, at
the same time, seats in specialized parliamentary committees that are particu-
larly relevant for groups.4 Decisive debates about government legislative pro-
posals take place in these specialized committees. It is therefore crucial for
groups to intervene at this stage. The distribution of group ties across
various specialized parliamentary committees provides an indication of the
strategic presence of groups in the committees.
For corporatist groups, two parliamentary committees are of particular
importance: the economic affairs and taxation committee (CEAT) and the
social security and health affairs committee (CSSH).5 The number of
leading positions in citizen groups occupied by MPs has increased in both
committees, but much more in the CSSH than in the CEAT (+37.4 per cent
versus 13.4 per cent, see Table 5). In 2010, the CEAT members were much
more connected to corporatist groups than the average MP (60.1 per cent
versus 40.2 per cent, Tables 4 and 5). This was already the case in 1985.6
In comparison, the committees of less relevance for economic associations,
such as the legal affairs and political institutions committees, consist of
MPs who are much less connected to economic organizations, whereas
the environmental and energy committee is populated by MPs entertaining
ties to environmental associations (data not presented here). If there is a
clear increase in citizen groups’ access to Parliament, it should be nuanced
according to the domains of responsibility of the committees. Corporatist
groups remain overrepresented in the committees dealing with economic
and social policies.
The revalorization and increasing importance of the Parliament, especially
its legislative committees, have induced groups to reinforce their presence in
the parliamentary venue. They follow a deliberate strategy to ‘send’ and
recruit MPs in relevant parliamentary committees to intensify their influence
in this venue (Eichenberger et al. 2016).
Comparison and discussion
The empirical data largely support our hypotheses. Our first expectation – that
citizen groups increase their presence – is generally supported, even if more
for the parliamentary than for the administrative venue. Concerning the latter,
we observe a significant decline in the number of extra-parliamentary com-
mittees in both countries. As for the composition of these traditional
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corporatist structures, changes are not so notable, and both countries exhibit
similar trends. In Denmark, corporatist groups (business associations and
unions in particular) continue to dominate the administrative venue, as they
had privileged access both in 1975 and 2010, but citizen groups have made
some minor inroads in terms of increased access. The presence of Swiss
business groups in extra-parliamentary committees is also declining, but
they remain dominant. Swiss citizen groups are much better represented
over time, however, while the position of unions remains stable. Furthermore,
business associations are the most active groups during the administrative
consultations organized in 2010. Nevertheless, citizen groups formulate
about one-third of all comments on specific bills. It is worth noting that
Swiss unions are very passive in this step of the pre-parliamentary phase.
Concerning the revalorized parliamentary venue, we notice an increased
presence of both corporatist and citizen groups. In Denmark, citizen groups
gained increased access to the parliamentary venue as more MPs have a
trust link to such organizations than to corporatist associations. In addition,
significantly more letters are sent by citizen groups to legislative committees.
In Switzerland, the shift is even clearer: while business associations largely
dominated in 1985, citizen groups have since strongly increased their connec-
tions to MPs. This observation should be nuanced, however, since the absol-
ute number of MPs connected to economic associations has also increased,
illustrating their more active strategy towards the parliamentary venue, and
corporatist groups are better represented in specialized committees dealing
with economic and social policies.
In both countries, citizen groups have clearly become much more present
and active in both venues, but particularly in the parliamentary venue. The
difference between the administrative and parliamentary venues can prob-
ably be explained by a strategy of venue specialization: corporatist groups
still dominate the traditional administrative venue, considered as the best
arena to negotiate compromises. Business associations in particular are
better represented and probably more influential in the administrative
venue (Culpepper 2011), whereas citizen groups (have to) follow a strategy
of conflict expansion at the parliamentary level and develop strong links to
political parties and individual MPs (or, in Switzerland, make use of direct
democratic instruments).
Our second expectation – that citizen groups will fare comparatively better
in Switzerland than in Denmark – also receives support. In the 1970s–1980s,
the composition of extra-parliamentary committees clearly distinguishes the
social version of corporatism in Denmark with the much stronger presence
of trade unions and the liberal version in Switzerland dominated by business
associations. The differences are less clear 30 years later as regards the
balance between business associations and trade unions in extra-parliamen-
tary committees, but the difference has grown as regards citizen group
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representatives, with 24 per cent of all seats in Switzerland compared to 16
per cent in Denmark (Table 2). The more strongly mobilized Swiss citizen
groups are also materialized for administrative consultations. However, the
greatest differences are found in the strategies of citizen groups towards
the Parliament. Even if access is measured differently in the two countries,
the growing presence of Swiss citizen groups in decision-making arenas
appears much more outspoken than the Danish.
Conclusion
This study is innovative, as it combines the literature on corporatism and pol-
itical opportunity structure to cover the rise of citizen groups and the press-
ures on corporatist systems at two points in time with a 30–40-year interval.
As expected, we observe a general trend towards institutionalization of
citizen group participation in administrative and parliamentary venues,
which reflects a pluralization of both corporatist systems. Corporatist groups
remain the most active by far, but citizen groups have won greater shares
of access to decision-makers. This is likely indicative of a more general
trend affecting Western societies, including the two countries included in
our study.
The case studies on Denmark and Switzerland reveal that the destabiliza-
tion of traditional corporatist structures has contributed to the affirmation
and clearer recognition of new citizen groups highlighted by stronger pres-
ence in both the administrative and parliamentary venues. However,
increased representation in corporatist structures does not automatically
imply more political influence for citizen groups, as corporatist arrangements
are playing a less important role in policy-making processes. On this point, it
should again be stressed that our comparative study only captures the pres-
ence of interest groups and does not allow us to draw conclusions on changes
in the power of both categories of interest groups. To address this question,
we should consider the power balance within corporatist arrangements and in
other institutional venues and policy arenas.
In the new context of mediatized politics, for instance, traditional corpora-
tist insiders, especially business interests, must adapt their political strategies.
They cannot rely only on their dominant position in the administrative venue
but have to diversify their strategy in order to be more present in the increas-
ingly important parliamentary venue, in the media or at the international
level. Some emblematic examples illustrate this trend, such as the media pres-
ence of the recently founded think-tank Avenir Suisse, financed by multina-
tional companies, or the massive presence of the Danish Federation of
Industries in the media (Binderkrantz 2014, 192).
The corporatist heritages of both countries probably reduce the speed with
which citizen groups can access decision-makers. Some group entrepreneurs
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may renounce start-up groups to whom they ascribe low success probability
for influence and organizational survival. However, Denmark underwent fewer
changes than Switzerland, where citizen groups have gained more presence
and positions in both venues. Because of its more open POS, especially the
frequent use of referenda, Switzerland is more open towards popular
demands and consequently also towards citizen groups. Swiss politicians
are encouraged to be more receptive and responsive towards organized citi-
zens. Swiss direct democracy often leads to the integration of citizen groups in
extra-parliamentary committees or to stronger connections with MPs. A
strong Danish labor movement itself brings some citizen group issues to
the decision-makers, for which reason responsiveness towards citizen
groups may be less in Denmark. Examples include the establishment of
housing co-operatives, sports clubs and scout-like youth organizations
related to the labor movement. Leisure education closely related to the
labor unions is another example (Pedersen 1989: 271f.) that may leave
fewer opportunities for non-labor movement suppliers of leisure education.
Danish labor unions were more than just unions; they became involved in
people’s lives in many ways. Finally, the more professionalized Danish Parlia-
ment and the almost endless minority governments – some of which are weak
– may be less in demand for citizen group inputs in the fight for intra-govern-
ment discipline and government survival.
The present study also provides evidence of important changes in presence
and mobilization of interest groups in the administrative and parliamentary
venues of the law-making process. This finding paves the way for further
studies focusing on ‘multi-venue’ strategies of interest groups. Concretely, it
would make sense to compare specific legislative processes in Switzerland
and Denmark (see Pedersen et al. 2014) and investigate if and to what
extent different (types of) interest groups participate in both administrative
consultation (bill preparation) and parliamentary committee activities (bill
treatment). Such a process-tracing design should demonstrate if interest
groups ‘venue shop’ and, consequently, if there is a clear revalorization of
the parliamentary venue, or if some interest groups still accumulate privileged
access to both administration and parliament. Interviews with both corporatist
and citizen groups are required to identify their advocacy strategies. In particu-
lar, it is worth investigating if increased presence of citizen groups in the par-
liamentary venue is a deliberate strategy and if it increases policy influence.
Finally, we need to explore if the transformation of corporatist arrangements
is similar in all policy domains. Such a policy-contextualized approach raises the
question of whether or not citizen groups compete with traditional corporatist
associations on similar policy issues or if they rathermobilize on different topics.
Differences could also relate to differences regarding the mobilization and
access of corporatist versus citizen groups could be more important between
policy domains within the same country than across countries.
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Notes
1. Conversely, Schnyder and Jackson (2013) stress the dialectical and paradoxical
connection between neo-liberal reforms and the preservation of corporatism
in Sweden and Germany.
2. We only include permanent extra-parliamentary committees, not ad hoc com-
mittees created for a specific task and for which it is difficult to gather systematic
information.
3. Corporatist groups dropped from 71 per cent to 58 per cent of the population of
groups from 1975 to 2010, but their share of committee seats only dropped from
89 per cent to 84 per cent. Unions are still the most overrepresented group com-
pared to their share of the group population, but they have lost ground to
business groups. Altogether, citizen groups make up 42 per cent of all groups,
but they only occupy 16 per cent of all committee seats.
4. Permanent parliamentary committees have existed since 1979, but with limited
resources, and ad hoc parliamentary committees remain important. The 1992
reform reinforced resources of specialized committees.
5. These committees can be considered least likely cases to test the hypothesis
about citizen group access, as they deal with economic and social issues of
central importance for traditional corporatist associations.
6. The number of MPs with leading positions in major economic associations
peaked in 2010, when the presidents of the Swiss federation of trade unions
(USS), the Swiss Industry and trade association (USAM) and the Swiss farmers’
association (USP) were all members of this committee.
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